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THE JOINTRETIREMENT DECISION OF HUSBANDS MD WIVES
ABSTRACT
Theobjective of the paper is to find empirically whether husbands and
wives tend to retire at the sametime, andto give an explanation of the
findings. Similarity of retirement dates could be caused by similarity of
tastes (assortative mating), by economic variables, or by the complimentarity
of leisure.Each explanation would havedifferent implications for the
response of retirement to policy changes.
Both simple data analysis and economic models of the age of retirement
point to coordination of retirement dates: husbands and wives tend to retire
at the same time. According to the results, very little of the coordination
isdue to economic variables, and simple cross-tabulations rule out
assortativemating as an important explanation. This leaves complimentarity
of leisure. Because of data limitations, this conclusion is, however, mainly
qualitative.




Stony Brook, NY 117941. Introduction
Whereas the retirement behavior of wales has beenrather intensively
studied (Boskin and Hurd (1978). Burtchauser(198O).Mitchell and Fields
(1983,1984). Diamond and Hausman (1984), Wardand Boskin (1984). burtless and
Moffitt (1985). Hausman and Wise (l9BS). Honig and Flanoch (1985),Custman and
Steinmeier (1986). and Sickles and Taubman (1986)). verylittle attention has
been paid to the retirement behavior of couples, most likelybecause in a
self—weighting sample there are not many observations on workingwomen of
retirement age. For example. Fozzebon and Mitchell (1986) use just139 obser-
vations from the Retirement History Survey to study theretirement behavior of
married women. Because the labor force participation rateof women has grown
substantially over the last 30 years. the retirementbehavior of women will
become increasingly important in understanding many issuessuch as the future
size of the labor force, the number of retirees., andthe aggregate cost of So-
cial Security benefits. Cf particular interest isthe joint retirement behav-
ior of husband and wife, both becaus numerically couplesof retirement age
are more important than single people of retirement age,and because the joint
retirement decision is much more complex than the decisionof an individual.
Most research on the retirement of males finds thatthe date of retirement
is affected by the level of Social Security benefits,health. mandatory
retirement, and, to a lesser extent, by other aspectsof the economic environ-
ment such as the wage rate and assets. For example.Ward and Boskin (1984)
find that the increase in Social Securitybenef its duringthe early 1970s pro-
vided a good explanation for the decline in elderly malelabor force partici-
pation during thatperiod.They further find that bad health has a strongef-
fecttowards early retirement and that mandatory retirement at age65 approxi-
mately doubles the probability of complete retirementat age 65. (The indlr2
vidualretires rather thanfinding another job.) Ilausman andWise (1985) ob-
tain similar findings.Thisline of research generally considers only hus-
bands whose wives are not working, so the issue of the joint choice of retire—
went dates does not arise. Studies of family labor supply, however, typically
findthatthe wife's labor supply is influenced by the husband's wage rate or
by the husband's income. It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that
thewife's retirement date is influenced by the variables that help determine
the husband's retirement date. Whethn the husband's retirement date is
similarly influenced by the wife's variables is more of an open question.
Although a correlation between husbands' and wives' retirement dates has
yet to be firmly established, there are several kinds of reasons why one might
expect to find such a correlation.t If men who have a particularly strong
taste for goods marry women with similar tastes •onewould find a positive
correlation between retirement dates, even if retirement dates are not in-
fluenced by any economic variables. A correlation could also be caused by
economic variables: for example, both the husbands and wives in families with
substantial assets may tend to retire early, which would induce a postive cor-
relation in dates. A more interesting example is correlation caused by cross—
wage effects. Cross—wage effects could be due to income effects on the.
retirement dates of both husband and wife and/or by compensated cross—wage ef-
fects. The compensated effects result from a utility function in which the
own marginal rate of substitution of goods for leisure is affected by the
leisure of the spouse. One might well imagine such an effect particularly
with respect to. years of retirement: own retirement years may be less
pleasurable if the spouse is working because of constraints put on travelling
and so forth. This kind of reasoning would suggest that husbands' and wives'3
years of retirement are compliments. so that, cat. Dar., theywould desire to
retire at the same time.
This paper has two goals. The first is to give some empirical evidence on
the correlation between retirement dates. Do, in fact, husbands and wives
tend to retire at the sane time, and how strong is the tendency? The results
should provide a baseline for future research. The second goal is to find.
within the constraints of the data, whether observable economic variables con-
tribute to any correlation in retirement dates, and to find evidence of corn—
pensated cross—equation effects,
Thedata set is the New Beneficiary Survey. It hastheadvantage of a
substantial number of observations on working husbands and wives of retirement
age. Its main disadvantage is that it is a choice—based cross—section.which
limits the complexity of the analysis that can be undertaken.
The rain findings are that husbands and wives tend to retire at the same
time. Some of the results can be interpreted to mean that their retirement
years are compliments. There is weaker evidence that someof each spouse's
economic variables influence the retirement age of the other, but the findings
are not robust enough to attempt to find compensated effects.
2. Data.
The New Beneficiary Survey (liDS) is a survey of individuals who first
received S.ocial Security benefits in the window." June, 1980 through Hay.
1981 (Maxfield, 1983). The individuals and their spouses were interviewed in
October—December.1982. Nine catagoriesof recipients weredefined. For this
study the important ones are retired male workers and retired femaleworkers,
A retired male worker received his first retirement benefits during the
window, and was entitled on his ownearningsrecord, and similarly for retired4
femaleworkers. A numberofthe female workers, in particular, were dually
entitled. Within each catagory sampling rates varied by the age of the












Although the1435 isa choice—based sample, in a static population itcan
be used for analysis provided the proper weighting is used. For example, sup-
pose one wanted to find the probability that an eligible 62 year old would
receive his first benefits at age 63. This is a conditional probability, con-
ditioned on his not having previously received benefits. It is also called
the hazard rate or risk of receiving initial benefits at 63. In a static pop-
ulation the hazard would be the number of 63—year olds in the 1455 divided by
number greater than 62, all weighted by the inverse of the sampling rate.
Even though one does not observe the actual population of 63 year olds exposed
to the risk of benefit receipt, that population can be estimated from the
fractions of older vintages that reached 63 without having received benefits.
However, in a dynamic population this calculation loses accuracy because the
population of 63 year olds at risk is not the sum of the older recipients.
For example, if the population were growing, the population at risk would beS
under—estimated, so the risk would be over estimated. Similar reasoning ap-
plies to the estimation of the response of retirement age to economic vari-
ables. For example, suppose one wants to find how the wage affects the prob-
ability of retirement at 63. In a static population one observes the entire
distribution of wages and retirement dates, so that, in principle, the desired
parameter could be estimated. If wages are growing over time, however, the
olderrecipients in the MS come from cohorts that had lower wages when they
were 63 than the current 63—year—old recipients. One would associate low
wages with late retirement. Even ifthewage bad no effect on retirement, one
would estimate that the retirement hazard at 63 increases in the wage.
In the MS.therespondents and their spouses were asked extensive ques-
tionsabout their work histories, incomes, assets, wages andhealth condition.
From the answers, one can construct their economic environment at the time of
the interview, but not in the years before the interview. This limits the
complexity of the retirement model that can be estimated with the 1135 because
one does not know the alternatives that caused them to continue to work in
earlier years. This is a weakness of the 113$ compared with other data sets
such as the Retirement History Survey. The strength of the 1135 is that it has
a generous number of observations on recently retired husbands and wives.
3. Data Mtalysis.
The goal of this section is to present evidence on whether husbands and
wives tend to retire at the same time. No economic variables will be taken
into account, so the results will simply establish the kinds of behavior that
have to be explainedby a model.
In thesedata, someone is said to be retired when he is not working. In
that all respondents are at least 63 years old by the time of the survey, and6
havereceived retired workers' Social Security benefits there is probably
little unretirement. For the results of this section, thesample is
restricted to couples in which both the husband and wife have a date of leav-
ing the last Job. This eliminates couples in which the wife only worked when
shewasyoung because only jobs held after 1950 are recorded. For most of the
results the sample will be further restricted to include only couples in which
both retired after the age of 54, so that the behavior accords more with what
is generally taken to be retirement.
In the reals—worker sample, 1536 couples satisfied these requirements, and
several other minor requirements concerning missing data. The median dif-
ference between the husband's and wife's retirement dates is about 3.8 years.
In that the average age difference is about 3.1 years •thisimplies that many
husbands and wives retire at about the same age. Table 1 gives the distribu-
tion of the difference between the husband's and wife's retirement dates. In
the male—workers sample, 6.1% of couples retired in the same month; 9.4%
within one month of each other; 11.01 within two months of each other; and
24.6% in the same year. In the female—workers even greater coordination of
retirement dates is found: 8.5% retiredwithin the samemonth. Although it
is not shown in the table •noother concentration of the difference in retire-
ment dates appears. That is, the distribution is flat everywhere except at
differences of a year or less, where there is substantial mass. The table
certainly suggests joint determination of retirement dates.
To find if the coordination ef retirement dates could be induced by the
Social Security system, the distribution was calculated by the retirement age
of the respondent. The idea is that Social Security has different effects at
different ages •sothe amount of coordination of retirement dates should vary7
byage. For example, if eligibility for benefits at age 62 causes both hus-
band and wife to retire at the same time, onewouldexpect a greater con-
centrationof the distribution among respondents who retire at 62 than among
respondents who retire at 63 or 64. The table has some suggestion of such an
effect in the female—workers sample, but it is not verified in the male—
workers sample. In fact, no pattern is apparent in both data sets. The table
does not distinguish coordination of retirelentdue to economic variables from
coordinationcaused by coisplimentarity in leisure; but the table would appear
to rule out coordination caused by assortative mating because while assorts—
tivematingwould induce a correlation betweenretirementdates, it would not
cause suàh high concentrations within a year.
The remainder of this section will be devoted to other ways of studying
tbe correlation in retirement dates thatissuggested by the findings in Table
I. The idea that husbandsand wivesdesire. to retire at the sametime willbe
called the joint retirement hypothesis.
table 2 shows the probability in the male—worker sample that the wife
retires in a particular age interval as a function of the husband's age at
retirement and of the difference in their ages. For example, among husbands
who retireat age 62 and whoarethesameage as their wives, 30Z have wives
whoretirebetween 55 and 59. This number [s calculated from the relevant
sub—sample of the male—workers sample by taking the ratio of the number of
wives who retire at 55—59 divided by the total number of husbands who retire
at 62. The average is unweighted because the conditioning event means that
approximately all the observations in a column receive the sameweight.Many
of theentries in the table are missing because of sample selection: having
selectedon husband's retirement age and age difference, one cannot observe8
the fraction of wives that retire at certain ages. Consider1 for example,
husbandswho retiredat 62 and aro three years older than their wives. At the
time of the surveymostof thehusbands were63;theirwives were 60. and
some of the wives were still working. One does not know how many will retire
at 62. The table does not extend beyond age differences of 4 and —l because
the number of observations becomes small.
If the joint retirement hypothesis is correct, the wife's retirement prob-
ability will vary with the age difference: the wife's retirement probability
should be greatest at the age difference when both husband and wife can retire
at the same time. An example is when the husband's retirement age is 62 and
the wife's retirement age is 55—59. When the age difference is 2, the wife is
60 at the husband's retirement; when the difference is 3, she is 59. One
would expect, therefore, the probability the wife retires at 59 to be greater
when the age difference is 3 than when the age difference is 2, and the table
shows that to be the case. & counter—example is whon the husband's retirement
is 65, the wife's retirement is 63—64, and the age differences are 0 and 1.
One would expect a higher retirement probability to be associated with the
greater age difference, but that is not the case. Only a few similar ;om—
parisons can reliably be made because of missing data or small samples. If
one restricts comparisons to cells in which the husband and wife retire at the
same time and cells adjacent to those, Just five comparisons in which the
probabilities are based on more than 15 observations can be made. Table 3 is
an extract of Table 2; it has comparisons that are based on 10 or more obser-
vations. The last column indicates whether the comparison supports the Joint
retirement hypothesis: 6 of the 9 entries show support.
Table 4 has the probability the husband retires classified by the age at
which the wife retires and by the age difference; the probabilities are based9
on the female—workers data. Seven comparisons of retirement probabilities
similarto those in Table 3 can be made; six support the joint retirement
hypothesis.In total, then, 12 of16 comparisons support the hypothesis. The
fractionof successful comparisons is different from 1/2 at about the 0.05
significance level.
These kinds of comparisons are not very systematic, and some subjective
judgement is exercised in choosing the cases. Furthermore, one would think
that age differences would shift the entire distribution of retirement ages.
which would change the retirement probabilities at every age. For example
husbands who are four years oldâ than their wives should be less likely to
retire at younger ages than husbands who are the same age as their wives.
Eecause husbands tend to be older than their wives •manyof the retirement
probabilites are not reliable in the wale—worker data. The rest of the data
analysis, therefore, uses only the female—workers sample. The object of anal-
ysis is the distribution of the husband's retirement age conditional on the
retirement age of the wife. The joint retirement hypothesis implies that as
the age difference increases the probability that the husband retires at an
early age decreases; that is, the entire distribution of retirement ages
shifts towards greater ages.
The retirement distributions, conditional on the wife's retirement age,
are given in Table S. They are found by summing the retirement probabilities
in Table 4. Anexamplewhere thejoint retirement hypothesisis generall3?
supported is found in the column headed 60—61 and the rows labelled 55-42. If
the husband is one year younger than the wife, he would have been 59 or 60
when the wife retired; 602 of such husbands retired before the age of 63. If
the husband is 4 years older than the wife, he would have been 64 or 65 when10
thewife retired. The joint retirement hypothesisimplies that any of these
husbands would retireat 64 or 65, so that few would retire before 63. The
datashow that to be the case: just 25% of such husbands retired before the
age of 63. Generally the probability the husband retires should increase with
in each block as one moves down each column. Similar reasoning implies that,
holding constant the difference in age, the retirement probabilities should
decrease as the retirement age of the wife increases. An example is the
retirement probability at 61 or less of husbands who are the same age as their
wives: when the wife retires at 55—59, 41% of the husbands retire before 62;
when the wife retires at 66+, just 6% of the husbands retire before 62.
The entries generally seem to decrease both as the age difference in-
creases and as the wife's retirement age increases. It is desirable, however,
to verify this in a systematic way. One method is to calculate the trends in
the table. Table 6 has the least squares estimates of the trends in the
columns. The interpretation of the entries is the change in the husband's
retirement probability for a change in the age difference. in the example
mentioned before, inwhich the wife retires at 60—61, the probability that the
husband retires before 63 decreases by 0.067 for each year of age difference.
The average of all, the entries in the table is —0.033. This is a simple
measure of the shift in the retirement distributions for an increase in the
age difference. 21 of the 30 entries are negative, which gives additional
support to the joint retirement hypothesis. A roug1 idea of the change in
husband's retirement age for a change in age difference can be calculated from
the entries in Table 6. Taking the retirement ages to be the midpoints of
each interval (with 67 for the upper interval), one finds that a change of a
year in the age difference is associated with an increase in the husband's
retirement age of 0.44 year.11
Table7 has the changein the husband'sretirement probability for a
change in the wife's retirement age, holding constanttheage difference. For
example, when the age difference is zero the probability thatthehusband
retires before63 decreases by about 0.033 for each year the wife delays
retirement. The average of the table is —0.043. 28 of the 30 entries are
negative. The increase in husband's retirement age for an increase in wife's
retirement age is roughLy 0.41. Again, these results are consistent with the
joint retirement hypothesis.
A simplified summary of what the data reveal about the joint retirement
hypothesisis given in table 8.2 The entries are classified by age dif-
ference. They give the percentage distribution of the difference in retire-
ment age. The table aimstoshow thatthedifference in age at retirement is
systematicallyrelated to the difference in age. For example, if the joint
retirement hypothesis is correct, then husbands and wives who are the same age
willtend to retire at the sameage; thus, one ought to find that if the age
differenceis zero, a high fraction will have the same retirement age. In
Table 8 •25.8%of husbandsand wivesof the same age retired at the sameage.
Similar reasoning suggests thatthelargest entries in the table should be
along the diagonal: couples with the same difference in age will tend to have
the same difference in retirement age. That is exactly what is found in the
table: the greatest entry in every coltnn is on the diagonal.
4. Models of Retirement Age.
Theresults above certainly support the view that retirement dates are
correlated, but they give no indication of the source of correlation: joint
retirement could be induced by the economic environment, by taste variation,
or by complimentarity in leisure. For example, it maybethat wives and hus—12
bandstendto retire at the same timebecausethe wife's Social Security
benefit, based on the husband's earnings record, cannot be drawnuntil the
husband retires. Onewouldthen find correlation between retirement dates.
Further cross—classification by levels of economic resources would allow one
roughly to hold constanteconomic resources, but the counts in the cells would
becometoosmalltoallow interpretation.Auseful way to proceedis toin-
troduce amodel of retirement behavior. It will control for economic vari-
ables in a way dictated by the functional form. The, reader can interpretthe
results as an extension of the cross—tabulations or as indicative of behavior.
The vehicle for exploring theinfluenceof economic variables on retire-
ment age will be the Stone—Geary utility function. It can quite naturallybe
parameterized to include both systematic and random taste variationthat are
econometrically identified. The thought experiment that will lie behind the
estimation is as follows: given at age 55a fixed wage anda stockof assets,
workerschoose the number of additional years to work. From this point of
view, the age of retirement is an object of demand, and an equation that ex-
plains the retirement age is a demand equation. Because of the economic en-
vironment,however, there are someimportant differences from the usual kinds
ofdemand estimation; these differences will be discussedbelow.
Suppose that the husbandandwife maximize lifetime utility givon by
(l—31—82)ln(x—a) ÷B1ln(b1 —A1) + E21n(b2 —
in which x measure lifetime goodsconsumption; a isa parameter, necessary
goodsconsumption; A1is the husband's years of work (retirement age);
is the husband's taste parameter; and A2 and b2 are the wife's years of work
and taste parameter. As suggested by the cross—tabulations in Section 3, b113
and b2 will dependon the difference inages,and on randomcomponents that
are correlated. In addition they wilt vary with health status. For the mo-
ment assume thatthe lifetime budget constraint is given by
px— w1A1 VA + !.
in which p is the priceof x, w1 andw2are thewage ratesandYis
The retirement equations are
A1— (l—B1)b1 — B1(b2w2/w1+Y/w1
—
(1)
A2— (1—B2)b2—B2(b1w1/w2 + Y/w2—ap/w2).
Thetaste index of each person enters his own equation and his spouse's equa-
tion.Letb1 and b2 haveboth systematic parts and randompartsas
— xp1 +
— +
Upon substituting thespecifications of b1 andb2in the demand equations.
thedemandequationswill have a systematic partthatdepends on and
and error terms (derived from a1 and a2) that have a complicated
variance—covariance matrix. From the specification, the structure of the
variance—covariance matrix is known, and itofferscress—equation restric-
tions, With static wages and prices and realizations on A1 andone could
contemplate estimating the parameters, including the taste parameters and
variance—covariance matrix.14
In the NBS data a numberof obstaclesstand in the way of estimation.
Oneobserves assets atabout thetime ofretirement, so thattherealizations
onI will depend on the realizations on A. Neither pensions nor Social
Security hasbeenmentioned; yet they surely affect the retirement decision.
They have a wealth affect: couples with higher levels of pensions and Social
Securitywilltend to retire earlier. They have price effects; the reward
fromworkinganother year depends ina complicated way onage,thestructure
ofthepension, theSocial Security lawand the contributionhistory. The
priceeffects actthroughactuarial reductions in benefits,recalculationof
benefits toreflectan extrayear's earnings,and withinperiodeffects
throughtheearnings test. Full—scalemodellingofthe influenceof pensions
and SocialSecurityon the retirement of asingleperson isfar beyond what
can besupported bythe 1155 becausethedata givelittleinformation on these
variablesinthe yearsbefore retirement. Forexample,even atretirement
onedoes not knowtheincreasein the pensionor SocialSecurity thatwould
resultfrom anotheryear of work.
Theapproachto these problemsis to assumethatrealizations onassets
andonannuities (the sumofpensionsand SocialSecurity) arerepresenta-
tions of the opportunities available to a worker who is contemplatingretire-
ment, but that the realizations differ from the opportunites by a random com-
ponent thatdependspartly on the actualretirementage chosen. This implies
that assets and annuities should enter equations (I) as endogenous variables.
Annuities should have a different coefficient from assets as they are a flow,
not a stock.
Weighted averages of the data are shown in Table g• The weights account
for the stratified sampling procedure. It is evident that there are system—15
aticdifferences between the twosamples. Aswould be expected, thewivesin
thefemale—workers sample have a greater attachment to the labor force than
the wives in the male—workers sample: they retire later; they have higher
wages, higher Social Security benefits and pensions. They are in better
health as a smaller fraction say they have health problems that affect their
jobs. The husbands in the female—workers sample are different from the hus-
bands in the male—workers sample: they retire •arlier; they have lower
wages, fewer assets, smaller Social Security benefits and pensions, and worse
health. The health of the husband is a possible reason for the differences
between the two samples: the wives of husbands with bad health spent more
time in the labor force; the husbands had lower earnings and greater health
expenditures, resulting in lower assets at retirement.
The results from estimating the retirement—age equations (1) over the two
samples can be found in Table 10. The estimates certainly differ across the
two samples. At least partly this is due to large standard errors. Accord-
ing to the Stone—Geary utility function, the error terms have heteros—
cedasticity as well as cross—equation correlation. This was not corrected in
the estimation as .later results suggest the Stone—Gear)' framework may not be
appropriate. The emphasis here will be on the average of the two estimates.
Reference to (I) shows that in the husband's retirement equation the vec-
tor that explains husband's tastes appears directly, whereas in the wife's
equation the vector is multiplied by a factor of proportionality, 2'In
the husband's equation increases in the age difference increase b1, which in-
creases the marginal utility of work and hence increases the retirement age.4
The average of the effects in the two samples is about 0.26 per year of age
difference:increasing the age difference by a year would increase the hus—16
band's retirement age by 0.26 year, holding constant the wife's taste para-
meter, If the factor of proportionality in the wife's equation is negative.
whichit should be •onefindsthe same pattern of signsonthe age difference
variablesas in the husband's equations.
The husband's own health affects his retirement age in the expected way.
It is interesting that the few husbands who say health limits their work at
home tend to retire later. In th. wife's retirement equation the same nega-
tive factor of proportionality that multiplies husband's health should multi-
ply the age difference; yet, there is little consistancey of sign.
In the wife's retirement—age equation, the wife's taste index decreases
in the age difference, which is symmetric with the husband's. taste index.
Thus, if the age difference decreases (the wife becomes older), the marginal
utility of work of the wife increases and she retires later, Just as does the
husband if his age increases. On average a decrease of a year in the age
difference increases the wife's retirement age by 0.27 year, holding constant
the husband's taste index. The responses of the husband and wife are for
practical purposes exactly the same. The effect of age difference on the
wife's taste index in the husband's retirement equation should, at least.
have the same sign over the two samples, but there is no such cons is tancy.
In the wife's retirement equation, the wife's health indicators affect
retirement in the usual way: if health affects work on the Job. b2 decreases
and the wife retires earlier. In the husband's equation, bad health in-
creases the husbands retirement age. The effect is through b2, which if the
factor of proportionality is negative, decreases with bad health. This
reduces the wife's retirement age and increases the husband's.
The total effects of the economic variables cannot be read directly from
the table because of intereactions. As far as the own wage is concerned, it17
hasa positive effect if all the other economic variables with which it is
intereacted are put to zero. However, if they are evaluated at their sample
means, the wage effect takestheopposite sign: evaluating ownwage,spouse
wage,own annuity, spouse annuity and assetsat the samplemeansproduces
these estimates of the wags effects in years per dollar.
Effect of own wage on own retirement age
Husbands Retirement Wife's retirement
Male Data —.02 —.31
Female Data —.16 —.02
Thus increasing the own wage tends to cause earlier retirement, although the
change is not large.
The spouse's wage is interacted with the spouse's taste vector and with
the own wage. Evaluated at no health limitation and no age difference, the
average effect (over both samples) of the wife's wage on the husband's
retiremànt is about -0.02 year per dollar; the effect of the husband's wage
onthe wife's retirement isabout 0.02 year per dollar. These effects are
practically zero. -
Theeffect of own annuity (the sum of Social Security and pensions) on
retirement age averages about 0.04 year per thousand for husbands and 0.43
for wives. Both suggest the price effect dominates income effects: appar-
ently the annuity gain from delaying retirement is substantial.
The effect of the husband's annuity on the wife's retirement age is prac-
tically zero. An increase in the wife's annuity on the husband's retirement
age is positive and of moderate magnitude. An explanation for this is found
inthe wife's response to her own annuity: herretirement age increases, so
thehusband's retirement age also increases.18
Theaverage effect of assets on the husband'sretirement age ispracti-
cally zero. The average change in the wife's retirement ageisabout —0.006
yearper thousand dollars of assets. Because these data have considerable
variation in assets across households, asset variation can reduce the wife's
retirement age by several years.
The following table sumniarizes the effects of the economic variables.
Part A gives the estimated change in retirement age associated with changing
the economic variables from the 25th percentile point in the distribution of
the variable to the 75th percentile point. Part B gins the changes in the
variables that underlie the calculations.
A. Changes in Retirement Age.
Q!m Snouse Yn2— AnnuityScouse Annuity Assets
Husband —.52 —.08 .32 .47 .00
Wife —.61 .10 2.24 .00 —.40
B. Changes in variables.
QmHu& Snouse!zt— AnnuitySoouse Annuity Assets
Husband6.5 3.8 8.0 5.2 67
Wife 3.8 6.5 5.2 8.0 61
For example a change of $5.2 thousand in the wife's annuity is estimated to
reduce the wife's retirement age by 2.24 years.
One might well askwhetherthe Stone-Ceary utility function produces a
reasonable representation of the data. The response of retirement age to the
economic variables certainly seems reasonable, but this is not really a test
of the functional form. The utility function implies a number of cross—19
equationrestrictions which were not imposed in the estimation. They result
from the appearance of both taste parameters in both retirement equations.
The factor of proportionality is —B2/(l—B1) for the husband's index and —
forthe wife's index, and —B and —B2 are the coefficient, on as-
sets. But it would be taking the model beyond reasonable bounds to estimate
andBfrom the coefficients on assets for the purpose of checking the
equivalenceof the index parameters because of other implicit factors. For
example, wage rates are in dollars per hour whereas the utility
function refers to lifetime utility. A more generous test of the propor-
tionalityhypothesis rests on whether or not the12x4 matrix
—(ft1fi2$3$4)
hasrank one.Eachoftheis a 12—vector of the estimated coefficients
thatgive the husband's and wife's taste parameters. Each retirement equa-
tion produces two estimates of the fi, one from each data set. The form of the
test comes from noting that one should be able to write each vector as
fi —
whereIt1 is a scalar. This implies that B has rank one. The normalized
characteristic roots of E'8 are
.45 .32 .17 and .06.
The second and third are far enough from zero that a formal test was not con-
ducted •andB was concluded to have rank greater than one.
The retirement equations derived from the Stone—Geary utility function
are complicated and difficult to interpret because of the interactions. In20
thatthecross—equation restrictions do not seem to hold, a simplified
retirement equation was estimated. Retirement was made linear in all the
variables. The results of that estimation are in Table 11. As before, the-
estimationmethod is instrumental variables taking own annuity and assets to
be endogenous variables.
As far as the effects of own taste variables on own retirement age are
concerned, they are about the same as the average effects from the Stone—
Ceary formulation. Both formulations produce an increase in retirement age
of husbands of about 0.25 per year of age difference and 0.27 for wives. The
effects of the own health variables on own retirement age are as follows
Effect on own health on own retirement
Husbands Wives
Stone—Gear, Sianle Stone—Gear, S laDle
Job —.35 —.29 —.22 —.13
Home .60 .56 .47 .28
Both —.85 —.76 —.92 —1.10
The effects are remarkablyconsistentacross estimation methods,andthey are
verysimilar for husbands and wives. There is, of course, some question
about the interpretation of theses effects: they are based on the reported
health status after retirement. They will be the result of a mixture of
people who become seriously ill so that they cannot work, people who may have
a chronic minor illness so that they choose not to work and a range of people
in between. Although only lX—2X of the individuals report their health af-
fects work at home, they work about a half a year longer than people with no
such health limitation.
The effects of the economic variables can be most easily summarized by
giving the change in retirement age that would result from changing a van—21
able from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. The changes in retire-
ment age are as follows
Ownwage Spouse wage Own annuity Spouse annuity Assets
Husband —.13 —.04 —.41 .44 .40
Wife —.10 .10 2.68 —.12 —1.07
Theownwage response is practically zero here whereasin the Stone—Geary
formulationit was about —0.5year.Other differences are that in these
results an increase in own annuities causes the husband to retire earlier
whereas in the Stone—Ceary results he retired later. The wife's response to
assets is almost three tines as great as before.
The correlation between the residuals from the husband's and wife's
retirement equation is 0.29 in the male data and 0.32 in the female data.
Thus •eventaking into account the age differences and the spouse's economic
variables there still remains unexplained positive correlation between the
retirement ages.
If someone desires to work beyond the normal retirement age associated
with his primary job, often he must change jobs, and often the new job has a
lower wage rate than the primary job (Burtless and Moffitt, 1985; Guslnan and
Steinmeier,1986). Onewould therefore, tend to find a negative association
between the wage and theretirement age.Put differently, the wageon the
lastjob depends on the retirement age, so that, according to this reasoning.
it is endogenous in a retirement equation. to check the empirical importance
of this observation, the simplified retirement equation of Table 11 was
reestimated taking the own wage as well as assets and own annuity to be
endogenous. The results are very similar to those in Table 11. so they are22
not reported. Of particular interest is that the own wage response remains
small.
A further method to find the interaction between retirement ages is to
estimatea conditional retirement equation. It specifies that the retirement
age of, say, the husband depends on the retirement age of the wife. From
suchan equationone can directly read the magnitude of the dependence. The
theoretical Justification is based on the conditional, distribution of




in which p, is E(Y); p, is E(X); p is the correlation coefficient between Y
and X; andand a, are the standard errors of Y and X. Let I be the
retirement age of the husband and X be the retirement age of the wife. Then,
the coefficient on the retirement age of the wife in the husband's retirement
equation should be p o/a.
Table12 has the estimated conditional retirement equation. The func-
tional form is the simplified retirement equation of Table 11 with the addi-
tion that the spouse's retirement age enters as a right—hand variable. The
estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table
11sothey willnot bediscussedfurther.Of greater interestisthatthe
spouse's retirement age is an important explanatory variable. Increasing the
wife's retirement age by a year increases the husband's retirement age by
about 0.25 year (average over both data sets); increasing the husband's
retirement age by a year increases the wife's retirement age by about 0.3123
year. As discussed earlier, a rough estimate of the effect of the wife's
retirement age on the husband's retirement age can be foundfromtheresults
inTable 7. That effect is 0.41. Given the great difference in methods,
this compares rather well with the estimate in Table 12. These relationships
between retirement ages are in addition to any induced by the age difference,
which by itself would tend to cause retirement dates to be correlated.
Theconditional retirement results may becompared with unconditional
results by using the theory of normal random variables. As discussed above
the coefficient on X in the relationship E(YIX) should be p p was
estimated to be 0.24, c to be 2.71 andto be 4.15 ever the male workers
data in unconditional estimation of the retirement ages in the simplified
model with endogenous assets •ownannuity and own wage .Thusthe coeff i—
cient on X, the wife's retirement age in the conditional equation for the
husband's retirement age, should be 0.24*2.71/4.15 —0.16.The actual value
fromTable 12 is 0.18. The following table summarizes the comparisons.
Effect of Vile's Retirement AgeonHusband's
Retirement Age
Directlyestimated From Normal
Data Set (Table 12) Theory
Maleworkers 0.18 0.16
Female workers 0.33 0.19
Effect of Husband's Retirement Ageon Wife's
Retirement Age
Directlyestimated From Normal
DataSet (Table 12) Theory
Male workers 0.38 0.37
Female workers 0.36 0.2724
Thecomparisons are quite close and support further the Joint retirement
hypothesis. The general impression is that thehusband'sretirement age has
agreater effect onthe wife's retirement age than the wife's on the hus-
band's. This accords withthegenerally accepted view in the labor supply
literature.
5.Conclusion.
The results support the idea thattheretirement of husbands and wives is
a Joint process. Often both spouses retire within a short period. The dif-
ferencein ago seems to cause substantial variation in retirement age. The
rough estimate from the retirement probabilities is about 0.45 year per year
of age difference. From either the Stone—Geary or the simple model it is
about 0.25.. Given the wide differences in estimation methods, these
estimates are in good agreement and certainly support the joint retirement
hypothesis.
Generally the cross—economic variablesdo not have a strong effect on
retirementages, so they do not provide a good explanation for the correla-
tion of retirement dates. But it would be surprising to have strong cross
effects given that the own effects are not strong.This is surely at least
partlydue to weaknesses in the data and to the simplified estimation methods
required by the data. In particular one cannot construct the economic en-
vironment in the years before retirement.
The residual correlation between the retirement ages of husbands and
wives also supports the joint retirement hypothesis. Of course one does not
knowthe cause of the correlation: it could be due to neglected economic
variables, assortative mating, or true complimentarity in the utility func-
tion.25
Muchmote research on the Joint retirement decision is needed. In par-
ticular, a close modelling of Social Security and pensions should be able to
separate the wealth eEfects from the price effects. Nothing was done here
about adjustment of hours within a year, which is often accompanied by a
reduction in the wage rate. One would hope that future research would be
ableto account for these problems and to find the extent of true com—
plimentarity in retirement.26
Footnotes
1.Henretta and O'Rand find in the Rfl that increasing the age of the wife
decreases the probability that she will retire after the husband, which seems
to imply a correlation. But this result cannot be interpreted as a joint
retirementdecision: one would get the same resultif individuals in the
samplewere randomly attached to other individuals simply because increasing
age is associated with decreased labor force participation.
2. This table was suggested by David Ellwood.
3.Themodel does not have a role for the adjustment of annual hours of
work. In this formulation, the wage is implicitly the annual wage (earn-
ings); but in the estimation the hourly wage is used as itissurely a better
measure of the cost of leisure.
4.Thedependence of tastes on theagedifference was, in estimation not
reportedhere, represented by 10 dummy variables; the relationship was close
enough to linear that tastes were made linear in agedifferences between —4
and 6.
5.Thiscorrelation is slightly different from what was reported earlier be-
cause itcomesfrom an equation in which the own wage is endogenous.Table 1
Distribution of the Difference in Retirement Dates
Husband's Retirement Ate
Difference in
Retirement Dates 55—59 60—61 62 63—64 65 66+ All
Same Month 9.0 12.0 5.8 5.8 4.2 5.4 6.1
OneMonth 9.0 14.8 6.3 10.5 7.1 8.5 9.4
Two Months 9.0 15.5 9.5 12.1 9.9 10.1 11.0
Same Year 19.2 32.4 23.6 26.1 25.3 20.5 26.6
More than one year 80.8 67.6 16.4 73.3 74.4 19.5 15.4
Observations 78 142 190 397 355 386 1548
Note: Entries are percent of each column.
Basedon male—workers sample.
Source: Author's calculations from the NBS.
Wife's Retirement Aae
Differencein
RetirementDates 55—59 60—61 62 63—64 65 66÷ All
Same Month 8.9 6.1 10.4 8.1 6.1 11.98.5
One Month 11.5 10.6 14.0 11.0 8.5 14.511.5
Two Months 12.7 12.9 14.8 13.3 10.9 16.6 13.8
Same Year 28.0 27.2 33.0 28.3 25.4 27.7 28.1
More than one year 72.7 72.8 67.0 71.7 74.6 72.3 71.9
Observations 157 132 1.15 173 165 159 901
Note: Entries are percent of each column.
Based on female—workers sample.
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Notes: Based on male—workers sample. Age difference is husband's age minus wife's age —meansthe probability is not reliably observed.
'Basedon 10—15 observations.
bBasedon fewer than 10 observations.
Source: Author's calculations fromthe NES.Table 3
Comparison of Retirement Probabilities
Husband's Wife's
Retirement Retirement Age Retirement -
Mn Mn Difference Probability SuDDorts
60—61 55—59 1 .17' yes
o .14'
62 55—59 3 yes
2 .35
62 60—61 1 .26 no
o .30'
62 62 0 .10' no
—1 .20'
65 60—61 4 .17 yes
3 .10
65 62 3 .16 yes
2 .12
65 63—4 1 .22 no
0 .27
65 65 0 .23 yes
—l .00.







Retirement Me Difference55—59 60—61 62 63—64 65 66+
55—59 4 .09 .00 .15. .00' .06 .16
3 .25 .15' .06 .07 .09 .09'
2 .20' .06 .06 .19 .12 .00'
1 .22 .20 .21' .06 .14' .08
0 .29 .09' .11 .10 .00 .06
—1 .00' .30' •00b .08' .13' .13'
60—61 4 .09 .15 .23' .00' .06 .05
3 .10 .15' .06 .15 .05 .00'
2 00' 13 06 07 04 13'
1 .11 .10 .00' .03 .29' .08
0 .12 .27' .22 .00 .17 .00
—1 .23' .20' •20b .15' .07' .00'
62 4 .18 .10 .08' .00' .00 .00
3 .15 .08' .00 .07 .14 .27'
2 13' 19 17 00 12 13'
1 .11 .25 .07' .13 .00' .00
0 .00 .09' .33 .00 .06 .11
—1 — — — .15' .00' .13'
63—64 4 .14 .35 .08' .09' .18 .11
3 05 15' 29 15 09 18'
2 .1.3' .25 .44 .11 .04 .13'
1 — — — .13 .00' .00
0 — — — — .39 .17
—1 — — — — .40' .07'
65 4 .14 .15 .08' .00' .35 .16
3 .15 .23' .29 .15 .14 .09'
2 — — — .15 .12 .07'
1 — — — — .43' .04
0 — — — — .22 .06
—1 — — — — — . 27'Husband's Age
RetirementMe Difference 55—59 60—61 62 63—64 65 66+
66+ 4 .36 .25 .38' .91' .35 .53
3 .30 .23' .29 .41 .50 .36'
2 — — — .48 .56 .53'
1 — — — — .07' .64
0 — — — — .17 .61
—1 — — — — — .40'
Notes:Based on female—workerssample. Age difference is husbands age minus wife's age
—means theprobability is notreliablyobserved.
•Based on 10—15 observations.
bBasedon fewer than10 observations.
Source: Author'scalculations from the BBS.Table 5
Distribution of the Retirenteut Age of Husband
Husbands's Wife's Retire.ent Me
Retirement Age Me Difference55—59 60—61fl 53—54U
55—59 4 .09.00.15'.00'.06 .16
3 25 15'06 07 09 09'
2 .20'.06.06 .19.12'.00'
1 .22 .20.21'.06.16 .08
o .29.09'.11 .10.00 .06
—1 .00..30.00".08'.13' .13'
55—61 4 .18 .15 .38' .00' .12 .21
3 35 31' 12 22 14 09'
2 .20'.19.11 .26.16'.13'
1 .33 .30.21'.10 .43 .16
0 .41.36'.33 .10.11 .06
—1 .23'.50 .20".23'.20'.13'
55—62 4 .36.25.46'.00'.12.21
3 50 38' 12 30 27 36'
2 •33' .37 .28.26.28'.27'
1 .44.55 .29'.22 .43 .16
0 41.45' .67.10 .22 .17
—1 .54'.60.60".38'.20'.27'
55—64 4 .50.60.54'.09'.30 .32
3 .55.54' .41.44 .36.55'
2 .47'.62.72.37 .32'.40'
1 —— — .45 .50 .32
0 —— — — .61.33
—1 —— — —.60'.37'Husbands's Wife's Retirement Am
Retirement Age
Me Difference55—59 60—61fl 63—64j
55—65 4 .64 .15 .62.09.65 .68
3 .70 .77 .71.59.50 .64
2 — — — .52.44.47'
I —— — — .93 .36
0 —— — — .83 .39
—1 —— — — .73 .60'
Notes: Based on female—werkerssample. Agedifference is husband's age
minuswife'sage. —meanstheprobability is not reliably observed.
1,ased en 10—IS observations.
"based en fewer than 10 ebservations.
Source: Author's calculations from the NBS.Table 6
Change inHusband's Retirement Probability for aChange In Age Difference
Husband's Wife's Retirement Me
Retirement
Me 55—59 60—61 63—64
55—59 .009 —.042 .012 —.010 —.003 .005
55—61 —.016 —.057 .005 —.018 —.017 .013
55—62 —.021 —.061 —.067 —.036 —.011.011
55—64 .015 —.010 —.090 —.101 —.069 .014
55—65. —.060 —.020 —.090 —.215 —.054 .007
Basedon female—workers sample.
Source: Calculated from Table 5.Table 7
Changein Husband's Retirement Probability
for a Change in Vile's Retirement Age
Husband's Retirement Me
Me Difference 55—59 55—61 55.42 55—64 55—65
4 .005 —.004 —.024 —.031 —.023
3 —.016 —.026 —.016 —.008 —.017
2 —.012 —.005 —.008 —.020 —.013
1 —.015 —.010 —.027 —.040 —.285
0 —.024 —.040 —.033 —.140 —.220
—1 .006 —.017 —.038 —.115 —.065
Based on female—workers sample.
Source: Calculated Iron Table 5Table 8
Distribution of the Difference in Retirnent Age
Difference Difference in An
in Retirement
Age —4to—2 —l 0___ 2 3 45 jQjj
—6 to —2 43.1 17.3 15.3 10.612.010.8 5.8 14.710.2 14.3
—1 9.324.09.8 5.8 1.4 2.6 6.6 6.4 6.97.1
0 10.615.425.814.07.76.27.3 2.85.7 10.4
1 6.610.611.728.018.75.75.1 5.56.5 11.7
2 4.04.89.810.123.014.49.56.45.3 10.3
3 11.3 5.86.86.812.023.214.610.15.7 10.7
4 5.3 1.94.95.36.710.329.914.76.59.0
5—6 4.611.59.29.710.112.411.726.622.5 13.1
7—9 5.3 8.76.89.78.614.49.512.830.6 12.9
TotalPercent 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of 151 104 163 207 209 194 137 109 245 1519
Observations
Notes: Entries are percent of each column.
Difference in age is husband's age minus wife's age.
Difference in retirement age is husband's retirement age minus wife's
retirement age.
Based on combinedmale— and female—workers samples




RetirementAge 63.1 58.4 61.2 62.7
Wage (5) 10.91 6.65 7.68 10.42
Assets (5) 96,190 96,190 76,452 76,452
Health Limitations
None .63 .55 .66 .44
Job .14 .14 .10 .13
Home .01 .01 .02 .01
Both .22 .30 .22 .42
Social Security Benefit (5) 6,368 2,656 4,384 5,540
(Annual)
Pension (5)(Annual) 5,384 1,060 1,436 3.920
Note: Dollar entries in 1982 dollars.
Source: Author's calculations from the NBS.Table 10
Stone—CearyModel of Retirement Age
Male—WorkersSamule Female—Workers Samt,le
Husband Wife Wife Husband
Ret. An Ret.An Ret. Ae Ret. Aee
A.Husband's tastes
AgeDiff. a 6 1.10* —.02 .09 4.10*
6>AgeDiff. >—4 .16* —.00 —.02 •35*
—4a Age Diff. .51 —.47 —.17 —2.35*
Health Work —.48 .01 —.08 —.23
Home .19 .09 .77 1.03
Both _.60* —.23 .04 —1.10*
B. Wife's tastes
Age Diff. a 6 .52 3.90* —.25 —.76
6>AgeDiff.>—4 .05 —.46* —.07 —.05
—4a Age Diff. —.68 3.02* 1.15 —1.20
Health :Work .17 .04 —.49 .03
Home 2.73* 1.55 —.61 .84




Constant —2.08 —1.16 —.56 —1.29
Spouse Wage —.15 .22 .01 .21
OwnAnnuity (**) .43 55$* •45* .92*
(thous. annual)
Spouse Annuity .56* —.14 .11
(thous. annual)
Assets(**)(thous.) —.014 —.067* _.023* .013
.06 .24 .09 .27
Observations 983 983 702 702
Notes: *— It! > 1.96
Age Diff.—husbandage —wifeage
(**)Endogenous Variable
Source: Author's calculations from theNBS.Table 11
Simplified Model ofRetirementAge
Male—WorkersSaole Female—Workers Sable
Husband Wife Wife Husband
Ret.Ate Ret. Ate Ret. Ate Ret. A2e
AgeDiff. ￿6 1.46* —3•33* —.08 3.65*
6 >AgeDiff. >—4 .19* —47* —.08 •3j*
—4 Age Diff. .04 2.37* 1.13 _3.16*
Own Health
Work —.42 .1.0 —.36 —.16
Home .42 1.15 —.60 .69
Both —.31 _l.52* _.68* _l.14*
Spouse Health
Work •9Q* —.18 .50 —.01
Home .81 .75 .28 .49
Both .38 —.28 .20 .31
OwnWage —.00 —.04 —.01 —.04
SpouseWage —.01 .03 —.00 —.01.
Own Annuity(**) —.056 .615* .415* —.047
(thous. annual)
Spouse Annuity .064* —.037 .006 .106*
(thous.annual)
Assets(**) .006 —.011 _.021* .007
(thousands)
Observations 983 983 702 702
It2 .06 .21 .09 .23
Notes: *— ti>1.96
Age Diff. —husbandage —wifeage
•
(**) Endogenous Variable
Source: Author's calculations from the NBS.Table 12
Determinents of Conditional Retirement Age
Hale—Workers Satnie Female—workers Sanle Husband Wife Wife Husband Ret. Ate Ret. Age Ret. Ate EtAae
Age Diff. a 6 1.98* —2.13* —1.36* 3.68*
6 >AgeDiff. >—4 .26* —.30* —.09
—4aAgeDiff. —.41 2.21* 1.65* —339*
Own Health
Work —.45 —.11 —.19 —.22
Home .17 1.02 —1.24 .75 Both —.43 —1.51* —.85* —1.10*
Spouse Health
Work .69* —.09 .47 —.29
Home 1.07 .76 —.24 .37
Both .51* —.08 .37 .41
Ownwage(**) —.02 —.05 —.01 —.01
Spouse Wage .00 .03 —.02 —.01
Own Annuity(**) .007 .801* .546* .038
(thous. annual)
Spouse Annuity —.001 —.049 .017 —.004
(thous. annual)
Assets(**) .003 —.012 —.033* .007
(thousands)
Spouse Retirement .18* .38* .36* •33*
Age
Observations 983 983 702 702
1(2 .12 .26.. .14 .30
Notes: *— Iti> 1.96
Age Diff. —husbandage —wifeage
(**) Endogenous Variable
Source: Author's calculations from the NBS.References
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